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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW[V
So under the statute the mother's bequest could not be added to the
son's trust and be administered as part of that trust even if it were in
existence when he died. But under Section 231.47(2) even though the
mother's bequest is not accepted, or the son's will is not admitted to
probate within the period limited in Section 231.47(1) and the mother's
will contained no alternate disposition of the property, her will shall be
construed to create a trust upon the terms and conditions contained in
the will of her son as of the date of her own death. As the son's will
containing charitable bequests was not revoked as of the time of the
mother's death, the mother's testamentary bequest would be valid under
Section 231.47(2). Had the son revoked his will before his mother's
death, the bequest by the mother would not have been valid under the
statute because there would be no will of the son in existence at the
time of the mother's death from which a trust could be construed.
A final analysis of Section 231.47 leads to the conclusions that this
section controls devises and bequests to testamentary trusts and does
away with the common law doctrine of incorporation by reference.
Under the facts of the Brandenburg case a constructive trust will be
invoked to sustain the mother's bequest only if the son has not revoked
his will including charitable provisions before the mother's death; and
if the son revokes his will before the mother's death, the mother's be-
quest will fall outside the protection of the statute.
DENNIS LINDNER
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Silence-Admission to the Bar:
On May 6, 1957, the United States Supreme Court decided the first
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California case.' Prior to that time Raphael
Konigsberg, having successfully passed the California bar examination,
had applied for certification for bar membership. Under California law
the California Supreme Court may admit to the practice of law any
applicant whose qualifications have been certified to it by the California
Committee of Bar Examiners.' The Committee declined to certify
Konigsberg on the ground that at the Committee hearings Konigsberg
refused to answer questions relating to his membership in the Commu-
nist Party.3 At the hearings he had stated unequivocally his disbelief in
violent overthrow of government and had stated that he had never
knowingly been a member of any organization which advocated such
action. He further submitted witnesses to substantiate his good char-
acter. He would not, however, answer questions regarding his present or
1353 U.S. 252 (1957).
2 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6064.
3 No person may be certified "who advocates the overthrow of the Government
of the United States or of this state by force, violence or other unconstitu-
tional means." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6064.1.
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prior Communist Party affiliations. He even went as far as to deny he
was ever a "Communist" in the philosophic sense, but steadfastly re-
fused to respond to questions regarding Communist Party ties. He de-
clared that inquiry into political organizations, or any organization for
that matter, was beyond the scope of the Committee's authority.4 The
Committee declined certification because of his refusal to answer. The
California Supreme Court refused review. The case proceeded to the
United States Supreme Court on certiorari. 5 In that decision the Court
decided that because Konigsberg had established a prima facie case of
good character, the State's refusal to admit him to the bar was without
rational support in the evidence and therefore offensive to the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court did not de-
termine whether his refusal to answer questions at the investigation to
consider his qualifications could constitutionally afford an independent
ground for exclusion from the bar. The decision to deny Konigsberg's
petition by the California court was reversed and the case was re-
manded for further proceedings. The California Supreme Court then
vacated its previous order denying review and referred the matter back
to the Bar Committee. The Committee held more hearings and Konigs-
berg again refused to answer questions about his alleged membership
in the Communist Party while offering evidence as to his good moral
character and again declaring that he had at no time ever advocated vio-
lent overthrow of the government. The Committee again declined to cer-
tify him and the California Supreme Court again refused review.6
Certiorari was granted to the United States Supreme Court.7
In an opinion written by Justice Harlan, the Court found in Konigs-
berg v. State Bar of Clifornia,-U.S.-, 81 Sup. Ct. 997 (1961), that
an applicant for admission to the bar bears the burden of proof of "good
moral character" and that the State was not precluded from asking any
questions which might rebut the applicant's evidence of his good char-
acter.8 The essence of the decision was that by refusing to answer the
questions presented to him about prior Communist activity, Konigsberg
had obstructed a full and complete investigation by the Committee and
was rightfully denied admission to the bar.
Konigsberg's principal contention was that he was constitutionally
justified in refusing to answer these questions because by ordering him
to answer such questions his rights of freedom of speech and associ-
ation under the First Amendment as embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment would be violated. In rejecting this contention, the Court
reiterated the well-recognized principle that freedom of speech and as-
4 Supra note 1, at 294.
5 351 U.S. 936 (1956).
52 Cal. 2d 769, 344 P. 2d 777 (1959).
7362 U.S. 910 (1960).
8 81 S. Ct. 997, 1002 (1961).
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sociation are not "absolute" freedoms. 9 The Court then mentioned two
ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower
than an unlimited license to talk or remain silent. The first type of cases
mentioned are those in which the now famous "clear and present dan-
ger" test had been used.10 This test had been applied to situations where
certain types of speech have been considered outside the constitutional
protection because the utterances create a danger to the people of the
United States. This test was not applied in the Konigsberg case because
the Bar Committee's procedural rules were not aimed at outlawing or
restricting a particular type of speech or association. Also, the Court
did not rely on the "tendency" test as formulated in Gitlow v. New
York" or the formula worked out in Dennis v. United States" because
the Konigsberg situation dealt with "freedom of silence" rather than
"freedom of speech."
The test that was applied in the case was one that has been labeled
the "sliding-scale"" test or "balancing" test.' 4 An excellent description
of this test was laid down in American Communication Ass'n v. Douds.'5
In substance it states that when the effect of a regulation upon First
Amendment liberties is relatively slight and the public interest to be
protected is substantial, the public interest outweighs the partial loss of
freedom and the regulation should be upheld. Although the Douds case
was concerned with "dangerous speech," the test seems to be the same
when the subject is "dangerous silence."'16 In the present case the Court
weighed the loss of Konigsberg's freedom against the State's interest
in having loyal and qualified individuals as attorneys and officers of the
court and came to the conclusion that the State's interest outweighed
the individual interest.' 7 Thus, the Bar Committee was able to deny
Konigsberg's petition to become a member of the California Bar.
It seems to follow from the case that if Konigsberg had admitted
he bad previously been a member of the Communist Party while offer-
ing a prima facie case of present non-advocacy of overthrow of the
government, the Bar Committee would have been compelled to admit
him. This is assuming, of course, that there was no other evidence that
indicated he had current Communist ties. Apparently the sole ground
for denying admission was that by refusing to answer the questions pre-
9 N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 499, 460 (1958).
10 Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
"1268 U.S. 652 (1958).
12 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
13 Lusk, The Present Status of the "Clear and Present Danger Test"-A Brief
History and Some Observations, 45 KY. L. J. 576, 600 (1957).
'14 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, -U.S.-, 81 Sup. ct. 997, 1013 (1961).
15 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950).
26 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126-127 (1959).
17 Konigsberg v. State of California, supra note 14, at 1007-1008.
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sented, he thwarted the Committee's investigation of his "good moral
character."' s
Justice Black wrote a strong dissent which exemplified his long
standing position in the area of free speech.19 The basis of his opinion
is that he feels the Bill of Rights is being "balanced" right out of ex-
istence.20 His thought is that the "clear and present danger" test is itself
too restrictive of individual freedom and, of course, the "balancing"
test is objectionable because it further restricts freedom of speech or
silence. He suggests that the Court abandon any or all such tests and
interpret the First Amendment literally. It appears that if the Court
were to follow justice Black's philosophy on the matter, freedom of
speech or silence would become "absolutes" or "near-absolutes."
It is doubtful if the Konigsberg decision had any real impact on the
case law concerning restrictions on freedom of remaining silent except
to reiterate the Court's position.2' However, the decision does make it
clear that admission to a state bar is considered of sufficient public
interest to make the "balancing" test applicable to procedure for ad-
mission. The case also points out that past membership in the Com-
munist Party is not sufficient per se to exclude an individual from a
state bar. The regulating group of the bar association must, however,
be free to consider all available information before determining whether
the applicant is presently a member of a subversive organization or
advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force. This
includes an opportunity to weigh any information which the applicant
possesses.
An interesting case was decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court
subsequent to the Konigsberg decision. The facts in Lowenstein v. New-
ark Board of Education, 35 N.J. 94, 171 A. 2d 265 (1961), are very
similar to the main case except that the individual involved was engaged
in teaching rather than aspiring to practice law. This case was the
culmination of litigation beginning in 1957.22 The Newark Board of
Education had dismissed Lowenstein because he refused to answer ques-
tions pertaining to his Communist Party activities before 1953. He an-
swered questions presented by the Board pertinent to conduct from
Is The Court also rejected Konigsberg's contention that the California procedural
rule was unconstitutional because the burden of proof was shifted back to the
applicant after he had made out a prima facie case of good moral character.
The Court's determination was that the burden of producing substantial evi-
dence on the issue of advocacy was not upon Konigsberg but upon the Com-
mittee. See supra note 8, at 1009.
19 With whom Chief Justice Warren, and Mr. Justice Douglas concur. Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan wrote a separate dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice War-
ren.
20 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, supra note 14, at 1012.
21 Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
22 Prior occasions before the New Jersey Supreme Court are reported in Laba
v. Newark Board of Education, 23 N.J. 364, 129 A. 2d 273 (1957) and Lowen-
stein v. Newark Board of Education, 33 N.J. 277, 163 A. 2d 156 (1960).
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the present to 1953 but would not answer anything regarding his activi-
ties beyond that year. In its most recent remand the New Jersey Su-
preme Court stated that the Board of Education could inquire into
Lowenstein's past Communist ties only if they doubted his present
Communist affiliations. The Board then repeated their questioning as
to his ties with the Communist Party before 1953, apparently because
they doubted his present Party membership. Again Lowenstein refused
to answer these questions giving 1953 as the cutoff date beyond which
he would give no answers. Lowenstein did, however, make certain re-
plies and offered evidence intended to establish present loyalty. The
Board nevertheless again dismissed him. The New Jersey Court then
reversed this dismissal on the ground that the answers given by Lowen-
stein were not enough to engender doubts as to his present loyalty. The
court's determination of this question is somewhat difficult to under-
stand because whether the Board had honest doubts is something which
only the Board itself could decide and the Court,. in effect, stated that
the Board should have no doubts because the Court had no doubts. This
position seems inconsistent with the prior remand.
The Lowenstein decision is certainly not consistent with the Konigs-
berg ruling although there is a possibility that the Court based its hold-
ing on the fact that two members of the Board who voted for dismissal
grounded their vote on facts unrelated to the teacher's advocacy or non-
advocacy of overthrow of the government.2 3 The dissent in the case cited
the Konigsberg decision and felt that the Board was justified in its dis-
missal because of the failure to answer the questions.2 4
In conclusion, the writer feels that the majority in the Konigsberg
decision was correct. The United States of America should be allowed
to protect its national security from subversive organizations even
though by doing so there is a partial restriction on our freedom to re-
main silent. The undermining influence that is recognized as the Com-
munist conspiracy should not be aided by the courts of a nation in
which a change of government may be accomplished through the peace-
able means of democratic elections. It should be kept in mind that there
is always a danger that the Court will become too militant in restricting
freedoms and not "weigh" the conflicting dangers accurately. However,
this possible consequence is quite remote as the United States Supreme
Court is very much aware of the dangers in restricting individual lib-
erty when it is not vital to the public interest to do so.
JOHN D. PAYANT
23 One member voted for dismissal because he had grave doubts as to whether
Lowenstein was "a normal American teacher." A second member voting to
dismiss stated that he was not going to base his decision on legal technicalities
but rather on the moral issues involved. 171 A. 2d 265, 276 (1961).
24Id. at 293.
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